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Liberation without Democracy? Rethinking the
Experiences of the Southern Africa Liberation Movements
"Unconventional thought is a force for development. It is wrong to
suppress it. The likes of you and I were thrown to the lions in Roman
times and burnt at the stake in the Middle Ages as heretics. We would be
labelled as dissidents if we lived in Eastern Europe." So the ANC's
Ronnie Kasrils quotes Jack Simons ("a legendary figure in our Movement")
as once saying to him — to Kasril's surprise — during a discussion, in
exile, of the issue of Soviet "dissidents" A This comment, in turn,
prompted further reflection from Kasrils himself, as he recounts in his
recent memoirs:
Such a view was seemingly at odds with the basic demands of the
Movement. Our life and death struggle demanded unity and
vigilance. Again there was the tension between security and
personal choice, which mirrored the contradictions in countries
attempting to build socialism. Intellectuals like Jack Simons and
Ruth First, and to a lesser degree myself, might see the dangers
of suppressing independent thinking, but virtually everyone else
took what is generally referred to as a "hard line". And this did
not stem from the Party, where the role of the intellectuals was
considerable. It arose from the intolerable oppression that was
the life experience of the black comrades, leaders and rank and
file alike. For them the unconventional attitudes espoused by
Jack were a luxury of bourgeois society. It was for this reason
that many black comrades, particularly workers, continued to
sympathise with Stalin's tough practices.2
Kasrils probably underestimates the independent impact of "the Party"
(the SACP) in helping underwrite, within the ANC alliance, the
"necessity" to validate undemocratic practices in the name of realizing
"revolutionary imperatives". Nonetheless, his formulation is an
intriguing one since it places on the table an issue that has haunted
the process of southern African liberation ever since the "thirty years
war" to realize such liberation from white minority rule was first
launched across the region in the early 1960s. A practice of "liberation
without democracy"? Does this summarize adequately the politics of the
thirty years war? Was there a range of significant variation between the
practices of different liberation movements across southern Africa in
this respect? And what have been the implications for post-liberation
politics of the wedge which was always liable to be forced open between
"liberation" and "democracy" in the course of the region's war? These
are some of the questions the present paper will seek to address,
although it will do so in only a very preliminary manner, prefatory to
both a more fully articulated paper by the author and the evolution a
much larger project (a history of, precisely, the "thirty years war" for
southern African liberation (1960-1990) on which I am presently
engaged).
I. Democracy as a practice within the movements themselves
Namibia, perhaps, provides the worst case scenario with respect to
the question we are asking, as Colin Leys and I have sought to document
in our recent writing on the history of Swapo.3 Prom very early on a
culture of unquestioned "presidentialism" and "no questions" was
validated by the emergent Swapo leadership and woe-betide any one of
attempted to debate in any serious manner the line of march ordained by
the leadership. The seven "China-men" who queried Swapo policies at
Kongwa in 1968' were quickly turned over to co-operative Tanzanian
jailers when they tried to resign from the movement. The China-men, in
turn, were precursors of the several thousand "dissidents" — largely
youth (many connected to the Swapo Youth League) fresh into exile, in
1974, from the recent heroic struggles inside the country — rounded up
by the Zambian army in 1976 at the request of the Swapo leadership
because they rebelled, demanding a congress wherein that leadership's
activities and the progress of the struggle might be reviewed.
As we have argued, this crisis, sometimes misnamed the "Shipanga
crisis", was really Swapo's "democratic crisis"4 — and was an important
moment in exemplifying some of tensions inherent in the politics of
liberation during the thirty year's war. Certainly, the resolution of
Swapo's contradictions by sheer force de main did nothing to redress the
movement's weaknesses or enhance the quality of its leadership, and,
indeed, set the stage for its further degeneration in an authoritarian
direction. And this, in turn, culminated in the "mad-dog" activities of
Swapo's security apparatus during the 1980's. Then, in a frenzy of
torture and killing of innocent Swapo members at its Lubango base, the
"securocrats" came very close to destroying the organization on the very
eve of the flurry of international horse-trading that would soon produce
a transition to independence in Namibia
There were severe tensions within Mozambique's Frelimo movement as
well, coming to a head in the definitive show-down within Frelimo in
1969. Here the internal balances were struck rather differently, in part
owing to the quality of leadership displayed by Eduardo Mondlane and, in
turn, by the youthful group that crystallized around the person of
Samora Machel in the wake of Mondlane's assassination. Confronting
elements of a conservative old guard leadership (Uriah Simango principal
among them) within the frame of a relatively open congress Mondlane
consolidated his position and set the stage for his successor group, one
increasingly grounded in an interaction with the Mozambican populace
living in the rural areas, to win a subsequent showdown with Simango.
One could easily romanticize this achievement, important though it was:
the logic of military hierarchization did define much of the movement's
internal politics under Machel's leadership, even though the sights of
that leadership remained much higher than in some other regional sites
of struggle.
The Angola situation was more complicated, although it introduces
a dimension into our discussion that was far less salient in either the
Namibian or the Mozambican cases. Thus in Angola, the fact that two
(eventually three) significant liberation movements gained significant
political weight and that these movement's demonstrated a distinct
inability to resolve their political differences either by merger or by
relatively peaceful coexistence, contributed in its own way to the
freezing of an undemocratic ethos. Opinions differ as to the precise
weight of such diverse factors as ambition, ideology, ethnicity,
regionalism and Cold War calculus in determining this outcome. But there
can be little doubt as to the importance of Holden Roberto's aspirations
to a kind of exclusive "presidentialism" both within his own movement
(FNLA) and, even more markedly, within his so-called Angolan
"government-in-exile" (GRAB) in defining the early tone of (literally)
murderous intolerance that came to scar Angola's politics of liberation
— setting the stage for the carnage that, with considerable external
facilitation to be sure, continues unabated to the present day.
It would have been difficult enough to develop democratic
sensibilities under such circumstances. But the authoritarian ethos that
FNLA manifested internally from its very first days — an ethos that
came, by and large, to be reproduced within UNITA once Jonas Savimbi
left FNLA to establish a more exclusively Ovimbundu-based political
project — merely added to these difficulties. What of MPLA in this
regard? While undoubtedly the bearer of a more positive and expansive
definition of liberation than either of its rivals, its internal
political practice was also drawn towards a pattern of top-down closure.
The cruelty elicited during the period of Viriato da Cruz's early-1960's
split from the movement (one comes back to the execution of Matias
Migu£is and Jose1 Miguel by MPLA officials in 1965 as a particularly
pregnant example5) was a poor enough omen early on. But it also bears
noting that, in the year or two prior to the Portuguese coup, the MPLA
had allowed its inability to resolve internal contradictions — as
manifested in both the "Eastern" (Chipenda) and the "Active" revolts —
in any satisfactory way to substantially neutralize it, at least for the
moment, as an active agent of liberation. The fact that such challenges
were merely finessed by political sleight of hand helped further to
ground an ethos of nationalist high-handedness that growing Stalinist
proclivities (under Eastern European influence) were, all too
predictably, to reinforce.
In Zimbabwe, too, an extreme version of inter-movement rivalry —
once again, the product of a witch's brew of personal rivalries,
ethnicity, ostensible ideological difference and competitive
international sponsorship (Russia vs. China) — interacted with a
growing tendency to treat politics inside the two movements themselves
as a zero-sum game to produce some very hard-boiled methods, on the part
of both ZANU and ZAPU, of resolving differences and dealing with
dissent. One promising initiative designed to ventilate ZAPU politics in
a more open manner — the October 11th Movement — was crushed, while
the ZIPA attempt of the mid-1970s to ground a new politics of unity
around a unified army and a transformed political practice game came
unstuck: destroyed by renewed tension between the ZANU and ZAPU armies
(the Morogoro and Mgagao altercations) on the one hand and the
reassertion of its dominance by the "old guard" within ZANU.6
And when the ZIPA-linked "vashandi" in Mozambique continued with
their efforts to open up ZANU to revitalization from below even after
the incarceration (with Mo2ambican government assistance) of the ZIPA
leadership, they too were merely crushed by Mugabe, Tongogara and the
rest of the old guard. While arguments could be and were presented —
premised on the presumed imperatives of security and military
considerations — for dealing so expeditiously with "dissent", these do
not entirely convincingly rationalize away the extreme harshness of the
means adopted by the old guard in reestablishing its authority. True,
the ZIPA leadership was not quite the product of an internal upsurge in
the way the SWAPO dissidents of 1974-6 were, and, in fact, their project
probably carried less of a democratic charge ser se (as Moore has
emphasized, they seemed open to a degree of mutual elite'accommodation
with the older leadership if mechanisms were made available for
facilitating that). Nonetheless, even that degree the degree of open
debate and innovation which they sought within the movement was not to
be permitted thems study of the "vashandi" question — as well as of the
dynamics of the earlier Nhari rebellion within ZANU and the grim manner
in which it was terminated — begins to reveal that something rather
close to the Namibian pattern of "dissent-management" was stalking the
ZANU government-in-the making from a very early date.
And what of South Africa? Recent revelations, emerging recently
even from within the ANC itself, document "serious abuses" of power
within the movement's camps and a dramatic suppression of dissent on
some occasions.7 Opinions differ as to just how central or marginal
these flaws may have been to defining the essence of the ANC, and
certainly the internal history of the ANC in exile largely remains to be
written in any very balanced way. There is, however, evidence to suggest
that the 1969 Morogoro conference did provide an opportunity to
ventilate real grievances, particularly regarding abuses of authority
within the military structures. Some see the "African nationalist"
faction which jockeyed (unsuccessfully) for position within the
organization at that time as also being linked to such abuses and their
defeat as quite a positive one from that point of view. More controversy
surrounds the 1985 Kabwe conference which did address some of the issues
thrown up by the dismal spectacle, early-1980s abuses at Quatro camp,
but without hearing from, or even considering in any detail the cases
of, those who had paid an extremely heavy price for their querying of
the weaknesses of the movement at the time.
On the whole, the worst abuses of power within the ANC did not
begin to rival the crimes committed by Swapo in exile. In addition,
there is some reason to think that, more often than not, the strong
sense of commonality of purpose that existed across the ANC sustained an
ethos that anchored most leaders to a sense of high purpose and
minimized the need for dissent from below. Of course, this may sound
rather too Rousseauian ("the general will" and all that) for many
(most?) democrats' comfort. Clearly — and even more than most subjects
in this relatively under-researched area — this one demands both
particularly scrupulous conceptualization and further investigation. For
the moment note^merely that Albie Sachs, a first-hand observer, has
argued the special importance in safeguarding this (relative) openness
of the role played by Oliver Tambo. And he has also suggested the
importance of certain institutional/constitutional safeguards against
abuse that came into effect within the movement during and after the
Kabwe conference.8
II Democracy as a practice vis-a-vis the populace
Once again, the case of Namibia is instructive. In a very real
sense SWAPO's crushing of the democratic moment in 1976 was an index of
the primacy the external leadership's preoccupations — a complex mix of
diplomatic, military and more self-serving ones — was to exert over the
dynamics of internal struggle. In Zambia at that time the claims of the
vast draft of now-external activists drawn directly from the most
dramatic kinds of participation in the internal struggle were merely
shuffled aside. But a continuing (and often highly questionable)
instrumentalization of the internal front was to continue to be a part
of Swapo politics right up to 1990, as Leys and I have also sought to
document in our recent writing. This probably affected quite negatively
the possibilities of internal mobilization from the late-1970s. And, as
the 1980s wore on, it served to qualify — though not to stifle
altogether — the potential (seen in initiatives in southern Namibia
like Bricks and the Women's Voice and also in the resurgent trade union
movement) for the kind of assertive politics of an activated civil
society that marked South Africa resistance during the same period. In
Ovamboland, in the war zone, any above-ground activity was virtually
impossible in any event; here on-again, off-again guerilla incursions
did allow for the forging of ever-closer symbolic links (to some extent
cast in ethnic terms) between movement and populace. But Swapo carried
forward little experience of the institutionalization of a responsive
politics into the post-liberation round — either from its practice
inside the country or from its practice in exile.
The Mozambican case is very different from the Namibian one, of
course. On the one hand, Prelimo's political practice vis-S-vis the
Mozambican populace was articulated within substantial liberated areas;
on the other, there was no space for any of the legal above-ground
activity beyond the liberated areas that remained a dimension of
Namibian politics (especially in the southern part of the country)
throughout. And the fact is that Frelimo did manage to articulate within
its liberated areas a quasi-democratic practice of popular empowerment
that was real, if somewhat limited (as well being subject to some
romanticization at the time). In short, a link was established between
guerilla and peasant that was real and even two-way to the extent that
liberatory priorities came into congruence. Something of the same quasi-
democratic symbiosis was also created in many parts of the country
beyond the liberated areas in the period immediately after independence
— via the mechanism of the qrupo dinamizador, for example. Yet, as
noted below, such democracy-in-the-making was never really effectively
institutionalized in the new Mozambique and soon, under harsh
conditions, much of its promise began to wither.
Although a great deal of further research remains to be done on
the precise nature of the practices of the various "liberation
movements", on the ground in Angola, there seems to have been far less of
the kind of bonding between guerilla movement and populace that Frelimo,
at its best, produced in the areas under its control. It is true that a
certain notional link to popular aspirations became defined, along
primarily ethnic lines, in the case of both the FNLA (with the Bakongo)
and UNITA (with the Ovimbundu) — even if most evidence suggests that
such links were primarily manipulated quite parasitically by the
leaderships involved. Moreover, even the MPLA, despite the movement's
attempts to define a more broad-gauged project, could not avoid the
tacit emergence of some kind of ethnic symbiosis (with the Mbundu) as an
element within its project.
At the same time, some critics have argued that the highly
intellectual, often white and mulatto, leadership of the MPLA were
pulled towards an all too vanguardist approach towards "the masses" from
quite early on. Moreover, the MPLA, despite some continuing activity in
Cabinda and the Dembos forest, found itself largely operating within the
bleak and sparsely populated Eastern zones of the country. Some sense of
what a popularly-based politics should look like was kept alive
within the MPLA during this period, of course, and for a time this
helped underpin a progressive thrust to its post-liberation project. But
in such a context, and even more than in the Mozambican case, the pull
towards the establishment within the movement of a particular kind of
political culture — that which permitted, at best, the establishment of
a "left developmental dictatorship" — was very strong.
The actual military practice of ZANU — the most important of the
military challengers to the Smith regime — is a much debated topic.
Some have claimed for ZANU a very positive guerilla-peasant interaction
as being central to its eventual success, but others (Norma Kriger, for
example) have emphasized both the rather heavy-handed role that ZANU
guerillas played vis-a-vis the rural populace as well as the degree to
which quasi-traditional cults and quasi-traditional notables were often
merely incorporated, relatively untransformed, into the project of
"liberation". It is interesting that certain of the evidence suggests
that the moments when grass-roots democratization of the struggle may
have been closest to the surface occurred when ZIPA and not the "old
guard" was in charge of military-political operations.9 But this, too,
is a topic that will continue to warrant careful scrutiny.
As noted earlier, the ANC may well have retained, internal to its
own politics and despite such "serious abuses" of power as did occur
within the movement, a rather greater sense of the need for two-way
interaction with its ostensible popular base inside its country than did
Swapo. of course, it really had little choice but to develop this kind
of sense, such was both the strength of the mass movement on the ground
and the greater need to win a good part of the struggle inside South
Africa (in comparison with the less dramatic and, in any case,
geographically limited scope of internal resistance within Namibia on
the one hand and the even greater saliency there of a possible
international/diplomatic sphere [e. g. the United Nations] for advancing
the struggle on the other).
In the event, the ANC managed deftly to position itself at the
head of the popular movement, as the most recent events have confirmed.
It did so in part by means of a kind of symbolic interaction with the
mass of the populace, defined by its own historic resonance (and that of
the world's most famous prisoner of conscience) as an apparently
inescapable point of reference for on-going struggle, but also by its
ability to manifest, over time, at least a minimal military presence
("armed propaganda") that was profoundly legitimating. But the ANC also
developed institutional links — by means of its interpenetration with
the UDF and its emerging concordance with COSATU — to mass assertions
on the ground, assertions that had genuine democratic import, both real
and potential. As a result the ANC returned to south Africa from exile
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as merely one element — albeit the central element — within a much
broader "mass democratic movement" that must inevitably qualify some of
the autocratic ethos that the organization had developed in exile.
Ill Democracy: the legacy of the struggle
Ironically, in Namibia — where, perhaps, authoritarian practices
had reached their apogee within the liberation process — the transition
to independence produced a notably democratic constitution and electoral
process. To be sure, as Colin Leys and I have written in evaluating this
transition, the "democracy" exemplified by this outcome remains a very
specific and limited variant of democratic possibility:
What Namibia had was a liberal constitution, rather than a
democratic one; or more precisely, a liberal democracy of the
specific type familiar in the West to which modern scholars have
given names like "pluralism" and "democratic.elitism"; or, in the
plain words of an American scholar by no means wholly
unsympathetic to it, "representative government, ultimately
accountable to 'the people' but not really under their control,
combined with a fundamentally capitalist economy".1°
This is an important emphasis: for the heralding of such democracy has
become one of the key ingredients in the whole process of recolonization
in southern Africa. At the same time, the fact that even this degree of
democracy has been consolidated in Namibia is instructive in and of
itself. For, as hinted above, it could not readily have been predicted
from Swapo's record in exile, in fact, as elsewhere in the region, the
political aftermath of the liberation process cannot be extrapolated,
either readily or exclusively, from that process.
For experience suggests that outcomes in this sphere are over-
determined in quite unpredictable ways, and this is not least true of
the Namibian case. The whole process of internationalized decolonization
in Namibia — occurring as it at the dawn of the post Cold War era and
in a context of South Africa's own rethinking of its future — conspired
to draw relatively liberal technocrats, as distinct from the dangerous
securocrats, closer to centre stage within Swapo. And their liberalizing
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role was probably rendered even more secure when Swapo failed to win a
two-thirds majority in the first, constitution-making election. Not that
the future of even a liberal democracy in Namibia is fixed: the
securocrats still have certain key positions of power within the state
and talk still surfaces from time to time of establishing a one-party
state should Swapo win two-thirds "next time" (this yearJ). Here some
historical perspective may yet prove to be essential:
... the liberation struggle developed strength and resilience in
Swapo, and a tradition of challenge to authority, as well as one
of hierarchy and authoritarianism. All we can say is that what
prevailed during the struggle was the latter tradition, rather
than the former; and that this should not be forgotten or
underestimated when the balance sheet of the struggle is drawn up
and its implications for the future are assessed".11
"Overdetermination" is the operative word in the Mozambique case
as well: currently fashionable attempts to downplay the importance of
South African destabilization as the key ingredient in the demise of the
Mozambican revolution fail to convince.1^ But the weaknesses of
Frelimo's own political and economic practice made a significant
contribution to this outcome, nonetheless. For the notion of popular
empowerment that provided both the theory and, to some degree, the
practice of politics in the liberated areas found, in the end, little
real purchase within the institutions that came to define the new
Frelimo state. True, the leadership remained for some time committed to
a popularly-oriented project, even if not subordinated, in any very
strong sense, to a structure of democratic accountability vis-a-vis the
populace in whose name it acted. But, to an uncomfortable degree, the
military hierarchies of the liberation phase were merely given fresh
life by the authoritarian premises of a particular, heavily Eastern-
European influenced, brand of "socialist" endeavour (one-party state
"vanguardism", official "Marxismo-Leninismo" and the like). Whether the
Frelimo leadership would have overlooked the requirements of the peasant
economy so cavalierly in its economic planning had it felt moved to open
up its political system to greater popular involvement is a good
question. Had it done so might it also been less vulnerable to south
Africa and Renamo clawing away at its base?
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We have already noted that Angola's armed struggle provided an
even weaker foundation than was true in the Mozambique case for a
liberation cast in terms of genuine popular empowerment. Whether some of
the destructiveness of the Nito Alves confrontation in the immediate
post-liberation period might have been avoided had there existed a more
open political process is a subject worthy of further study. An MPLA-led
Angola was, in any case, soon overwhelmed by the facts of external
intervention, especially by South Africa and the United States (either
acting directly and/or through their brutal cat's-paw UNITA). it could
well be that the deep inter-movement divisions in Angola would have been
impossible, from quite an early stage, to reconcile through any
imaginable democratic process. But such intervention continued to feed
such divisions and was crucial in producing a social catastrophe in
Angola.
intervention also served to preempt any early chance that MPLA
would begin to open up democratic space from within its own project, the
presumed imperatives of war merely intensifying militaristic and
vanguardist pulls towards greater authoritarianism. And soon, amidst
socio-economic decay, the corruption of the leadership became another
ingredient of hierarchization of the system and popular demobilization.
True, when a form of competitive democracy, characterized in all
accounts as free and fair, finally came to Angola, MPLA retained enough
credibility to win the election. But UNITA was never really interested
in a genuinely democratic resolution of the situation. And so the war
grinds on.
Not surprisingly, the aftermath to liberation in Zimbabwe was also
far from being a brave new world of popular empowerment. True, Mugabe's
threat to create a one-party state never quite materialized. But the
actions of the notorious Fifth Brigade in crushing "dissent" in
Matabeleland seemed in many ways to represent an all too predictable
extrapolation from pre-independence "old guard politics". And an ethos
of middle-class comfort came to define most other activities of the new
elite.13 Meanwhile, peasant demands for land reform were 3lowly but
13
surely side-lined (and not merely because of the conditions of the
Lancaster House agreement) and the instrumentalization of popular
constituencies along ethnic and sub-ethnic lines became ever more
obviously the stuff of post-liberation petty-bourgeois politics in
Zimbabwe.
In South Africa the negotiating process itself has proven to be a
very ambiguous vector of "overdetermination" in its own right. As with
Swapo in Namibia, the ANC seems to have been drawn — in the absence of
outright victory and via the mechanisms of elite-pacting and judicious
international political and economic pressure — firmly onto the terrain
of liberal democracy. Certainly any tendencies towards authoritarianism
that the ANC might have carried home from exile will have been sharply
qualified by means of this process. More so than in Namibia, however,
there has existed in south Africa a much more active and progressive
range of actors within "civil society" who came to define, alongside the
ANC itself, the "mass democratic movement". These actors — trade
unions, civics, women's organizations, and the like — might have been
expected to keep democratic pressure on the ANC to constantly expand its
definition of liberation in a leftward direction. In some ways such
actors have been weakened by the electoralization/parliamentarization of
the transition process that has just occurred. Still, as I have argued
elsewhere, the democratic impulse towards socio-economic transformation
has by no means been fully tamed in South Africa.1* The ANC's
Reconstruction and Development Programme — for all its weaknesses —
becomes a terrain upon which the left can and must struggle to see the
sustaining of a genuinely progressive democratic-cum-socialist
possibility in the current transition: democracy with liberation!
IV. Conclusion
The above represents a very preliminary sketch of the more
finished paper I will eventually write on this theme, in a subsequent
draft more time will be spent exploring the concept of "democracy"
itself (although I have developed some of the relevant argument in the
paper referred to immediately above and the reader may wish to refer to
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that work!5). More time, too, will be spent not only in elaborating the
various country case-studies but also in drawing out more clearly the
connections, analytical and actual, between them. In doing so, one
particular challenge — to be only inadequately articulated in this
brief concluding remark — will persist: how to situate the very mixed
record — to put it mildly, in some cases — of democratic practice
within the liberation movements.
Clearly, serious abuses of power cannot be ignored: innocent
people, comrades with important contributions to make, have lost their
lives arbitrarily to those — acting in the name of revolution but often
with far more dubious motives — who sought to control dissent and/or
limit debate. At the same time, we cannot understate the fact that each
of these movements — within which abuses occurred and various
undemocratic practices flourished — made crucial contributions, in the
larger scheme of things, to bringing to book the brutal and profoundly
undemocratic white minority regimes that they fought against. There are
those who will argue, with some apparent plausibility, that undemocratic
practices were merely inevitable, even necessary, under the conditions
that defined the thirty-years war for southern African liberation; such,
they will say, was the logic of the very real military and security
imperatives defined by the waging of that war.
The fact that not all experiences of struggle in the region were
exactly similar — that some blended a process of liberation from
white-minority rule with fewer abuses and more of the substance of
empowerment from below — suggests this to be too simple and sweeping an
approach. Circumstances altered cases, certainly, but so too did
political choices made by leaders and populaces alike. However, very
refined criteria indeed are required in order to make such distinctions,
and also to ground reflection on the moral considerations that must
underpin any evaluation of these matters. Only through the process of
establishing more firmly my own perspective on the overall pattern of
the thirty years war — a process I reflect upon in a closely related
paper*6 — will I begin to feel more confident about making such
judgements.
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